We describe what is expected of a knowledgebased expert system, and the components from which such a system is constructed. We give a view of how an interplay between principles and practice has helped the knowledge system field to develop, and we give simple examples to show that reasoning techniques based on formal logic are now starting to provide a useful coupling between scientific and engineering work in the field. The examples are about logic programming, knowledge representation, judgmental reasoning, and about three methods by which a system can acquire the knowledge it needs.
Introduction
The rate of publication of articles about expert systems is now higher than ever before. There are survey articles in computer science journals, in popular computing and scientific periodicals, and in the general press. The volume of research publication is also unusually high. Expert systems have so far proved their worth in structure elucidation in chemistry, in helping to find mineral deposits, in helping technicians in hospitals, in suggesting maintenance procedures for locomotives, and in several specialties for which we do not have enough human experts. The commercial potential of the subject is now being recognized.
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expert systems, new research results, product announcements, and the formation of new companies in the expert systems area. In this article we look at some of the interplay between principles and practice in expert systems; we argue that it is fruitful to combine principles and practice closely, and that logic programming is a strong candidate for bridging the traditional gap between the two. We set out a particular view of where work on expert systems has come from, what is being done now, and of some of the trends for the future. Because of the scope of the subject, our view necessarily focuses on just some of the trends and achievements.
In the next section we describe the properties that we expect of an expert system. Section 3 sketches some central issues in expert systems from a historical point of view. Section 4 outlines the role of Prolog and logic programming in expert systems. In Section 5 we note that an expert system is only as good as the knowledge it contains, and we describe some methods of knowledge representation. Then, in Section 6, we describe some trends in knowledge acquisition. Section 7 is a summary.
What is an expert system?
We expect an expert system to act as an intelligent assistant in some task, or to solve an important problem that would otherwise have to be solved by a human expert. However, as the field has developed, we have come to expect more. Because the expert knowledge that people have may change with time, we would like an expert system to be flexible in integrating new knowledge incrementally into its existing store of knowledge. Indeed, we increasingly expect an expert system to assist us in the transfer of knowledge. We would also like it to be able to show its knowledge in a form that is easy for us to read. If we are to take actions with serious consequences in the real world, based on advice given by an expert system, then we would like the system to provide explanations of its advice [I] . Because the expert knowledge that people have is often incomplete and only partly understood, we would like an expert system to be able to reason with judgmental or inexact knowledge. This knowledge may be declurative (about the nature of a task), procedural (about how to do the task, and about how to do it efficiently), or both. Because we would like to concentrate on communicating expertise and knowledge, rather than on programming, we would like an expert system to be able to deal with simple sentences in English or other natural languages. Since there are many open research questions in natural language processing, it is perhaps fortunate that we can build useful expert systems whose natural language technology is shallow yet exact; a system can reason reliably and logically with English sentences whose meanings stem from the way in which they appear in rules, rather than from a detailed dictionary, syntax, and semantics of English. Almost paradoxically, these sentences can even contain judgmental phrases, such as "some evidence," yet can still be used by the underlying, exact reasoning method to yield judgmental conclusions. This simplified approach appears to be surprisingly useful. We can build effective expert systems whose English is limited, and we can add more sophisticated natural language processing as it becomes available. system to be able to do. It To summarize, here is what we would like an expert Should solve an important problem that would otherwise have to be solved by a human expert.
incrementally into its existing store of knowledge.
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There are useful expert systems that do not do all of the above, so these points are best read as ways to measure the sophistication of an expert system. They also serve to outline, in a general way, many of the main research goals in the field. In addition, we can now list the main components that we expect to find in most expert systems:
Facts, plus knowledge, often in the form of rules. An inference engine, for reasoning with the facts and rules. An explanation generator. A knowledge acquisition engine. A (possibly limited) natural language processor.
Perhaps because of the variety of things we expect of an expert system, there are many different names for such systems. They are known as knowledge-based systems, intelligent systems, intelligent knowledge-based systems, and so on. It seems likely that knowledge system will become the standard term. (For example, many of the expert system projects at Stanford University are now departments of a recently formed Knowledge Systems Laboratory.) We use the terms expert system and knowledge system interchangeably here.
From general to specific, and back again
In this section we sketch some central issues in expert systems work over the last three decades, and we outline how the issues are currently treated.
At a meeting in 1956 at Dartmouth College, John McCarthy coined the term "Artificial Intelligence." At the same meeting a system called the Logic Theorist was discussed. It proved theorems in logic [2] and may be thought of as the first, or at least one of the first, expert systems. It seems useful to outline the subsequent evolution of expert systems in the USA in terms of a thesis, an antithesis, and a synthesis. We then look at the corresponding evolution outside the USA.
solving can be found, and that these can be made computational and can be applied to many different problems. This approach is represented by the Logic Theorist (mentioned above), by the General Problem Solver [ 3 ] , and by early work in automatic theorem proving, e.g., [4] . Implicit in the thesis is the concept that the declarative and procedural aspects of how to solve a problem are independent of the task at hand. The idea is that we should just be able to declare what the task is, and the problem solver should then do it. While this thesis works well in principle, the early implementation efforts were very inefficient in practice. One apparent source of difficulty is that there is no obvious place, within the framework prescribed by the thesis, to put specialized procedural knowledge about how to do each task efficiently. In the absence of this knowledge, the problem solver searches for answers along many blind alleys before amving at a solution.
The thesis states that general methods of expert problem This difficulty led Edward Feigenbaum of Stanford University to advocate an antithesis. The antithesis states that, rather than looking for generality, we should set out empirically to capture human knowledge and procedures for specific tasks (see Feigenbaum and McCorduck [5] for a recent summary of this view). Essentially, we should be willing to write a new program for each task. This technique led to the first practical expert systems. For example, the DENDRAL program [6] is a "smart assistant" for a chemist concerned with structure elucidation in organic chemistry. The Meta-DENDRAL program (described in the same paper) is a knowledge acquisition program for DENDRAL. The antithesis approach, and its reduction to practice, has clearly been responsible for the present commercial interest in expert systems. However, the approach is intellectually labor intensive, so far as the acquisition of knowledge is concerned. It is usual for a knowdedge engineer to study the task at hand, specify appropriate inference engines, and then work with both task experts and programmers to construct a system. Since the conceptual levels dealt with by the task experts and the programmers are usually far apart, success can depend on the skill of the knowledge engineer. Often the experts, knowledge engineer, and programmers must invest years of work in building a useful expert system. Moreover, with the notable exception of DENDRAL, the systems so constructed have not by and large contributed much to our knowledge of the principles of expert systems.
Thus we have a thesis, that general problem solvers are desirable, and an antithesis, that the best practical approach is to build specific systems for specific tasks. The synthesis of these two approaches essentially takes the middle ground. The idea is that many tasks have requirements in common, and that these requirements can be met by an expert system "shell," to which we add knowledge about particular tasks. Typical shells, such as Emycin [7] and OPS5 [8, 9] , each cover a range of tasks, but no one shell covers them all. Clearly there are variations on this synthesis, one of which is to provide a "toolkit" containing many of the methods used in the various expert system shells. The Expert System Environment/VM [ 10, 1 I], KEE [ 121, and LOOPS [ 131 systems can be thought of as toolkits of this kind. Since even a toolkit may not support all of the expert systems that we may wish to build, it appears important that such kits be packaged as "open systems," in the sense that the underlying programming language is accessible. It should be easy to write new tools and to link them with the ones provided.
that there was no place in the general framework for procedural knowledge about how to do a specific task efficiently. So it is natural to ask how the synthesis avoids the efficiency problems that led to the suspension of the thesis. There seem to be several reasons why individual expert system shells are efficient enough to be useful. First, individual shells do not try to cover such a broad class of problems as the thesis methods, so each shell can be designed to be efficient for the class of problems for which it is intended. Second, the processing speed provided by the underlying hardware has increased significantly since the time the thesis was first proposed, although not enough for direct support of the thesis. Third, although we like to keep the knowledge about a task as declarative as possible, in practice we often program some efficiency know-how into it.
When we described the thesis about generality, we noted However, this last step tends to make the knowledge harder to examine and change. It is usually better to put as much of the procedural knowledge as possible in the inference engine.
computational power than we can supply, but it allows us in principle to just specify a task to be done, so that we do not have to give a procedure for how to do the task. Thus the thesis is computation intensive. The antithesis, on the other hand, is intellectual-labor intensive. Task experts, knowledge engineers, and artificial intelligence programmers have in some cases spent years building a single specialized system. The synthesis, taking the middle ground, tends to reduce the amount of intellectual work in constructing a system, and tends to result in a system that is reasonably efficient on current computers. Work on computer-assisted acquisition of knowledge, which we describe in Section 6, shows some promise of further reducing the intellectual work needed to build a system, without increasmg the computer power needed to run the system after it has been built. Interestingly, the more ambitious knowledge acquisition methods call for very large amounts of computing. Often this is worthwhile: We may be willing to compute for days or weeks to build a system, although we often expect fast response from the system once it has been built.
So far, we have outlined some central trends in expert systems in the USA since the late fifties in terms of a thesis, an antithesis, and a synthesis. The thesis was based on mathematical logic, while the antithesis and synthesis dispensed with the logical approach on the grounds of efficiency. Most of the experimental work in all three phases has been done in the language Lisp, invented by John McCarthy at about the start of the thesis period [ 141, and elaborated through many different versions since. Interestingly, although Lisp is designed for symbol manipulation, it is afunctional rather than a relational (logical) language; various operations for logic, such as unification and search, must be programmed in Lisp when needed.
Outside of the USA, there was a thesis stage concerned with automatic theorem proving, but there was generally much less of the antithesis-inspired activity in building individual systems. Around the mid-70s, the synthesis happened in the USA;, several expert system shells with good but not completely general coverage appeared on the scene. In the meantime research elsewhere also led to some new logical techniques for expert systems, and we discuss these next.
In its most general form the thesis calls for more
Prolog and logic programming
At about the same time that the synthesis made itself known in the USA, a new language called Prolog was designed in Europe [ 15-171. Although Prolog was first implemented to support natural language processing [ 181, it works essentially as an efficiently executable part of mathematical logic, so it is of interest for expert system reasoning, as well as for other tasks.
By 198 I, Prolog was adopted by the Japanese as the basis of their Fifth Generation Project [ 191. The technical aims of this ten-year project include fundamental work on both software and hardware for advanced knowledge bases. In 1984, at the end of the first phase of the project, substantial progress was reported on a Prolog-based workstation, a database machine, studies of parallel machines to support Prolog, and in some experimental expert systems [20] .
Prolog has a certain hybrid vigor, in that it contains some declarative features from computational mathematical logic [2 I , 221 and some procedural aspects from conventional programming. Thus it is called a /ogic programming language, and, like the expert system shells and toolkits, it occupies the middle ground between our general thesis and specific antithesis.
Prolog is somewhat weighted towards the thesis idea and towards generality. Many of the mechanisms one needs for an expert system shell are in the language, yet the language has very few features in the conventional sense. (For example, Prolog has a generalized logical pattern match called unification, but it is built-in, and one usually does not see it or call it explicitly when writing a program.) Perhaps because of the lack of conventional features, Prolog has a very elegant and practical semantics that seems to be the key to much of its appeal. For example, it is possible to say what a well-written Prolog program should compute, independent of any particular interpreter or compiler, and it is possible to say this precisely without getting into undue complexities. One analytical tool for doing this is model theory in logic [23, 241, which turns out, in many examples, to be quite close to the intuition that most people have about what a program should do. As a very simple example, the Prolog program
says that there is a route from X to Z either if there is a road from X to Z, or if there is both a road from X to Y and a route from Y to Z. It also says that there are roads from b to c, c to d, and d to e. The following is a model of the program:
c). road(c, d). road(d, e). route(b, c). route(c, d). route(d, e). route(b, d). route(c, e). route(b, e).
This is a model in the ordinary sense that every relevant instance of each rule in the program evaluates to true in the model. It is also just the collection of commonsense consequences of the rules and facts in the program.
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Because of its relation to mathematical logic, Prolog has a theoretical basis [25-271 as well as a body of associated practical experience. In fact, the theory and practice can be made to mesh quite well [28, 291 , and can be usefully extended to include relational databases [30, 311. it works very well as its own metalanguage. That is, it is rather easy to describe the semantics of Prolog in Prolog. While a Prolog interpreter written in a conventional language may occupy upwards of 10 000 bytes, an interpreter for most of Prolog can be written in Prolog in about 100 bytes (less than half a printed page). This may seem to be just an academic curiosity, until we realize that many inference engines for expert systems are somewhat similar to the Prolog inference engine. For example, by making relatively minor changes to a Prolog interpreter in Prolog, we get the core of the Emycin inference engine: by making some other changes, we get rules by which each object belonging to some class inherits the general properties of the class unless otherwise stated. We pay an efficiency price for this conceptual elegance, since the inference engines that we build in this way are generally slower than if they had been written directly. However, when supported by a fast computer, the performance is adequate for many tasks, the flexibility advantages are overwhelming, and it is possible to compile some aspects of the inference engine if necessary [32] . The inference engine consists of Prolog rules that function as metainformation; they we rules about how to use the rules for particular tasks. If we have procedural information about how to do a range of tasks efficiently (e&, always use a relevant fact before trying a rule), then we can encode this in the metarules that define the inference engine. Thus, in the metalanguage approach to expert systems in Prolog, there is a natural place for procedural knowledge, and the task knowledge can remain largely declarative. If our target is high performance on small machines, then we can first make a metalanguage prototype of the inference engine on a large machine and then rewrite or compile it as necessary.
We mentioned that Prolog is a simple language with few features. In fact, the main part of Prolog lacks many of the standard constructs of other programming languages. For example, destructive assignment (as in X:=5) is rarely used in Prolog, whereas modification of a working memory is a central feature of OPSS. This tends to guide the programmer away from machine-level state-transition programming and towards a more declarative style. Simultaneously, it appears to make pure Prolog (like pure Lisp) more suitable for implementation on parallel hardware [33] , and parallel hardware now seems to be promising for the support of some of the more ambitious tasks, such as real-time control, that are proposed for expert systems. Some expert systems for real-time control can be built by very efficient programming on a sequential machine [34] , while others One consequence of the simple semantics of Prolog is that appear to need more: specifically, the kind of underlying performance that is expected from parallel machines.
So far, we have sketched some of the issues in expert systems over the last three decades, both inside and outside the USA, in terms of a thesis about generality, an antithesis about specialization and efficiency, and a synthesis containing a partial return to generality. We have touched on a spectrum of activities from general to specific, and from theoretical to empirical. An expert system is only as good as the declarative and procedural knowledge that it contains. In the next sections, we look at knowledge representation and at knowledge acquisition.
Knowledge representation
In order to use knowledge in a machine, we must first choose a way of representing it. We need a notation that supports what we expect an expert system to do. The notation should make it easy for us to add and change knowledge, should be easy for us to read, and should support explanation generation. In addition, the notation should suggest ways in which it will be used and should allow us to write down different methods of use. The notation should also encourage us to separate declarative knowledge (what a problem is about) from procedural knowledge (how to solve the problem), yet it should support efficient problem solving. Thus we can use these criteria to estimate how useful conventional programming is for expert systems and to compare the various knowledge representations that are used for expert systems.
When we write a program in a conventional language, we are writing down knowledge about how to do a task. When we load the program into a computer, the computer could be said to acquire knowledge. However, it may be quite hard to add to the knowledge or to change it. It can also be hard for a person other than the author to read and understand the program, and it is rare for ordinary programs to provide explanations of what they do. On the plus side, ordinary programming notation does suggest how it is to be used, since the meaning of a program can (in principle) be worked out in terms of how it changes the state of the computer it runs on. Yet, most conventional programming languages encourage us to mix declarative and procedural knowledge so much that it can be difficult to separate the two. On the plus side again, the knowledge can often be used very efficiently.
The kind of task for which we build an expert system is, almost by definition, complicated. When we describe a task in English, we usually keep the description to a readable length by relying on knowledge that the writer and the reader already have in common. If the task is simple, it is usually feasible to write a suitable program from the description, although there may be many suitable programs. However, if the task is complicated and specialized, we cannot rely so much on shared knowledge. An English description of readable length is no longer enough, while if we make the description long and pedantic, we get lost in the details. So there are several notations for knowledge that stand somewhere between English and programs. They are useful to the extent that they allow us to write down knowledge in a form that both people (who need not be programmers) and computers can use. Some of our methods for representing knowledge for expert systems make use of the notion of a hierarchy, in which lower items are normally assumed to inherit some of the properties of higher items. For example, if a manager in a company is interested in expert systems, then we assume that the people who work in his or her group have the same interest, unless we are told that one of them specializes in hardware. Some notations for knowledge are often used without explicit reference to a hierarchy, for example, rules and nets. Others, such as frames and objects, are centered around the hierarchical notion. Although the various notations have been designed separately, and have been used for many different purposes, there is increasing evidence that each one can usefully be written down in logic. We look at some of this evidence next.
Knowledge is represented as rules in systems such as Emycin [7] and Syllog [30] . For example, an Emycin-style rule reads if "plant is wilting" and not "leaves have yellow spots" then "there is not enough water" : 60.
The number "60" indicates that we have 60% confidence in the rule and is used in a numerical form of judgmental reasoning. A Syllog rule reads site e g n u m b e r has e g t y p e rock in suitable form eg-group fossils have been found at site e g n u m b e r eggroup fossils are characteristic of the e g p period known reserves in eg-type rock from the e g p period """"""""_""""""""""""""""""""""""""". some evidence for oil at site e g n u m b e r Here, the conclusion below the line is established if all of the premises above the line are true. The " e g " items are variables that make the rule general. In Emycin, judgmental reasoning proceeds by chaining rules together to form deductions, and by using a built-in algorithm to combine the numerical confidences at each step in the chain. Thus it is a design assumption that there should be some way of assigning confidence numbers to rules so that the built-in algorithm will give reasonable answer confidences. The algorithm is a part of the Emycin shell, and most of its operation is hidden from the user. In writing a knowledge base it is not always easy to assign suitable numbers to rules, perhaps because one cannot easily tell without experimentation just what their effect will be on the answer confidences.
[35] describes an interesting approach to this problem.
In Syllog, there is no built-in algorithm for judgmental reasoning. When needed, judgments are written and used explicitly (and usually symbolically) rather than implicitly and numerically in the Emycin style. For example, the phrases "suitable form" and "some evidence" in the Syllog rule above carry judgment. If we carry the judgmental reasoning explicitly in this way, we are not forced to assume that there is a uniform method (e.g., Bayesian) for weighing evidence; the way in which evidence is weighed may be quite different from rule to rule. Although the lack of a built-in algorithm for combining numerical confidences appears at first sight to be a disadvantage, it seems very natural in practice to use judgmental English phrases in the syllogisms, and to show in explanations how the judgments are combined at each step.
For the Prospector system [36], knowledge is written down as a net with nodes and arcs. The nodes represent geological evidence or hypotheses, and the arcs represent causal linkages among the nodes. We can think of part of a net as represented inside the computer by the logical facts, such as arc(favorableAeve1-oferosion, arc(preintrusive-throughgoing-faultsystem, favorable-environment, 5700, 0.0001)
favorable-environment, 5 , 0.7)
This describes two arcs in a net. The first arc is from a node called "favorable level of erosion" to one called "favorable environment," and it bears numbers for judgmental reasoning. The second arc is similar, and both arcs can provide evidence to support the conclusion "favorable environment." For another method of representing knowledge in networks, see [37] .
We Now given that housel is a type A house, and that a type A house is a kind of house, we can reason that housel has 8 bedrooms and 2 bathrooms, and that, exceptionally, its walls are green rather than white. The notation is a succinct one for describing many houses, provided that the houses can be grouped according to common features. in several ways, including rules, nets, frames, and objects, and we have argued that logic provides a natural common notation. Many kinds of knowledge that are largely symbolic contain a few numbers, as in our examples above. Sometimes it is useful to express knowledge, particularly knowledge about how to search a space of possible actions for the best action to take, almost purely numerically; see [42] . In the numeric case logic is also a strong candidate notation. However, numeric knowledge is traditionally written down as functions rather than as logical relationsthat is, there is an implied direction of computation from input numbers to an output number. Writing the same knowledge in logic allows us, in principle, to also specify the output and generate the corresponding sets of inputs. This generalization is very powerful and often works directly in Prolog for the symbolic case. However, in the numeric case Prolog must usually be supported by extra knowledge about how to solve equations. Thus the ability to treat symbolic knowledge reversibly is to a large extent built into Prolog, while the same ability for numeric knowledge must in most cases be added by extra programming. For example, in [43] it is shown how to isolate a variable in an equation symbolically (and automatically) so that one can then use the equation numerically in the usual way. We have looked briefly at some of the useful ways of representing knowledge in a computer, and we have argued that logic is a useful common notation (see also [44, 451).
Next we shall turn to methods for transfemng knowledge
We have seen that symbolic knowledge can be represented from people to the machine. Before doing so, however, it is important to note that a choice of representation sets the framework in which the machine acquires knowledge. An unsuitable representation can make the task very difficult, while a suitable one can allow acquisition techniques that work well for one task to work for an entirely new subject; see, e.g., [46] .
Some trends in knowledge acquisition
As we mentioned, expert systems are also known as knowledge systems, and it is clear that they are useful only insofar as they contain knowledge. For a person it is an open question how much knowledge is innate and how much is acquired. For a computer, however, the answer is clear. All knowledge must be acquired, since nothing significant is built in during manufacture.
If we think for a moment about human learning, it is clearly difficult for a person to acquire a full slate of commonsense and specialized knowledge; it takes about a quarter of a lifetime, and this fact may influence our research approaches to machine learning [47] . We can calculate that, roughly speaking, a person may be able to change the information in his or her brain at a rate (in bits per second) that is at least comparable to, and may be much greater than, the rate at which the fastest current computer can change its information. So, if the human potential is in fact used for learning, and if artificial methods are no faster than the natural ones, we may expect the task of general knowledge acquisition for computers to be very difficult. It could require substantially faster computers than we now possess.
However, it already seems clear that we can write useful knowledge acquisition programs that can help us to build expert systems. We can set up some useful forms of machine learning, although what is currently practical falls far short of the kinds of learning that people can do. Once we have chosen to represent knowledge so that it is easy to examine and change, we can set up several methods by which a machine can acquire it. It is useful to group the methods like this:
Learning by being told. Learning by induction from examples. Learning by observation and discovery,
In the following subsections we look at each of these methods of knowledge acquisition.
Learning by being told
This is the simplest form of knowledge acquisition, and it can be surprisingly useful. We simply tell the system facts and rules about the task at hand. For example, in the knowledge system shell Syllog [48], we can simply add English-like syllogisms that contain knowledge about a particular subject, such as airline reservations or manufacturing planning [49] . We can easily examine the knowledge, and when the system answers a question, it can also provide an explanation of its answer. The implemented Syllog system does partial checking of the incoming knowledge. Checking can also be done in Emycin-style systems that use numbers for judgmental reasoning [50] .
We can make learning by being told more helpful, and thus hopefully use up less of the time of a human expert, by having an expert system assist in pinpointing faulty or missing rules. This process has been called "interactive transfer of expertise" [5 11. Once a faulty rule has been found, it can be specialized (e.g., by adding a premise) or generalized. If a rule is missing, it can be very useful if the system can suggest what kind of premises and conclusions should be added. Shapiro [52] describes some methodical techniques for computer-assisted debugging of Prolog programs that essentially interview a person at the terminal to find out, by example, what he or she has in mind. Notably, Shapiro's techniques are not only implemented as a program but also have a clear theory, based on models in logic, to back them up. The techniques extend to inductive inference of programs from examples, as discussed in the next subsection.
In principle we would like an expert system to check what it is told thoroughly. Basically, there are three things that can happen when we present a system with a new item of knowledge [53]:
a. The new item is already deducible from the current knowledge. Efficiency issues aside, we may set up the system to reject the item, with a suitable message to the user. b. The new item is inconsistent with the current knowledge.
Either the item is to be rejected, or the knowledge is to be changed before the item is accepted. Rejection is straightforward. Alternatively, we can set up the system to add the item automatically as an exception to the knowledge, or to hold a dialog about what action to take with the person providing the knowledge.
knowledge, nor inconsistent with it. The item is added to the knowledge. However, there may now be c. The new item is neither deducible from the current redundancies, e.g., if we have added a general rule that covers a number of facts. So we may wish to edit these out of the new knowledge.
We have spoken so far about adding an item to a knowledge base. In relational database systems [54] items are also deleted, and this presents some additional theoretical and practical problems. Indeed, Kowalski and Sergot [55] propose that, rather than deleting an item, one can add to the knowledge base the fact that the item ceased to be true at some point in time. This is intuitively appealing, perhaps because people do not automatically forget past facts or knowledge. It also has far-reaching consequences for database normalization theory. However, in practice it needs very large archival memories, and it may have to be combined with some measures to limit the amount of knowledge that is stored.
The steps a-c above can be written as a logic program that assimilates new information into a knowledge base. The declarative version of the program is short and clear, about a page of Prolog, and it works well for small knowledge bases. However, it is not efficient in general for large knowledge bases. There are some techniques available for writing a longer, more procedural logic program that is more efficient [56]. However, for certain knowledge bases, some of the checking that the program does is combinatorially hard. In this situation the natural choice is to only do partial checking, or (equivalently) to run the full checking program with a resource bound on steps a and b, and to do step c if the resources are used up. This can result in an inconsistent knowledge base. In principle, any answer to any question can be obtained from a logic knowledge base that is inconsistent. Fortunately, most logic programming interpreters and compilers, including the Prolog and Syllog inference engines, impose relevance conditions that prevent a local inconsistency from causing a global one.
So there is really a continuum here. Some knowledge systems provide no checking of the incoming knowledge at all, placing the entire burden on the users. Some, such as Syllog, do some checking, thus moving part of the burden from users to the machine. In future, additional machine speed, as well as more efficient methods, should allow us to increase the amount of checking that is done by the machine. We mentioned that, even with a consistent knowledge base, it is important that a system be able to explain the answers that it gives to questions. In the absence of full checking, explanations also give us a way of verifying the knowledge while a system is being built and when a system is in use.
Learning by induction from examples
It is now generally accepted that people often have expertise that they find difficult to write down explicitly. A person may be very good at a task, but may find it difficult to tell someone else, or a knowledge system shell, how to do the task. One reason for making the language of a system shell declarative and English-like, and for providing explanations, is that some experts may actually experiment directly with the shell and thus may be able to make their implicit knowledge explicit.
On the other hand, an expert can usually provide a wealth of examples about how to do a task for which we would like to build a knowledge base. A particular experimental study [57] found that a knowledge base induced automatically from examples of expert behavior gave better advice than one that was built "by being told" by the expert. In general, the difficulty is to make the leap from examples containing some underlying pattern to general rules that summarize the examples and are capable of dealing with new examples that have not been seen before. Logically, this is not a deduction (given K, and that K implies E, conclude E), but an induction (given E, find a "suitable" K such that K implies E). Here, the examples are represented by E, and the knowledge base that is to be found is K.
In thinking about criteria for "suitable" knowledge bases K, we can immediately rule out two particular inductive inferences from the examples E. A case that is much simpler than a real knowledge induction problem helps to illustrate this. Suppose we are given as examples E just the numbers 1 4 9 1 6 2 5 3 6 4 9 6 4 and we are asked for a K which generalizes this. Most people would say
K consists ofthe squares of the integers.
Intuitively, this is suitable. However, it is much easier to recognize suitability in particular cases than to capture it as a general concept. At least we can avoid two kinds of induction that are almost always unsuitable. The first is that K is just E, i.e., the induced knowledge base is just a look-up table of the examples that have been seen. This is unsatisfactory because we usually want a knowledge base that is smaller than the examples from which it was induced, and because no new examples can be handled. (In our simple case above, K would not imply 8 1 .) The second inductive inference is that K is the most general possible knowledge base that implies E; that is, it implies everything in the domain from which E is a sample. (In our simple case, K would consist of all of the integers.) Although such a knowledge base is often much smaller than the examples, it tends to be vacuous, in the sense that it indicates that anything is possible.
Shapiro [52] shows how to induce Prolog programs automatically from examples of their desired behavior. There can be many programs that cover a set of examples, but which one to choose is not the only concern. The number of examples needed to produce a program and the computer time needed for the induction process must also be weighed. Shapiro gives an induction algorithm that can be used with different search strategies. In one case a strategy that needs many examples yields a short program, while a strategy that sometimes needs fewer examples can (with an adverse ordering of the examples) yield an arbitrarily long program. Kitakami et al. [ 5 8 ] describe a way of combining knowledge acquisition by being told with the inductive approach of Shapiro.
Several criteria have been used to strike a balance between small, overly general inductions on the one hand, and large, overly specific ones on the other hand. In the Ockham system [59] , a Bayesian measure was used to steer a search through a space of causal graphs. Quinlan [60] introduces a system in which a decision tree is induced from examples, and different trees are ranked by the amount of information that is gained from the questions asked. Relational databases can be compressed, as described in [6 I] , by replacing several entries by the name of the class to which they belong. For example, "cat" and "dog" could be replaced by "mammal." However, they could also be replaced by "pet." The resulting compressed databases are inductive generalizations, and their succinctness can be compared by running the compression backward and seeing how close we get to the original database. Mitchell's version space technique [62] provides a compact representation for all of the inductive hypotheses that are compatible with a collection of examples and nonexamples of a concept. The idea is to store the most general hypotheses that do not imply any nonexample, and the most specific hypotheses that do not exclude any example. The admissible hypotheses then lie in a "version space," which is partially ordered by generality, between these extremes. If a balance criterion is added, then the hypotheses that satisfy it can be found from the version space.
We noted in Section 5 that there are many different representations of knowledge, but that logic is a useful common notation. As we have seen, there are many different criteria for judging the quality of an inductive inference. It appears that further empirical work is needed to relate these criteria and to try to find some useful common ground amongst them.
Learning by observation and discoverv
So far, we have looked at learning by being told and at learning by induction from examples, both of which are techniques for acquiring knowledge for subsequent use in an expert system. In this section, we look at the extent to which a system can be said to discover new knowledge.
In learning by being told, the system is given facts plus general rules about how to use the facts, which together amount to a knowledge base K that implies the advice that we wish it to give. Generally, K is very much smaller than an explicit listing of the advice.
In learning by induction from examples, the knowledge acquisition part of the system is given a collection of examples of good and bad advice (so labeled) from which it should induce a knowledge base K that implies the good advice, refrains from implying the bad advice, and gives correct advice on examples that are not in the original collection. In order to do this, the knowledge acquisition engine needs a guidance criterion (let us call it G) to choose a "good" knowledge base K that implies sensible consequences.
For learning by discovery, we equip the knowledge acquisition system with a minimal initial knowledge base k, some operators 0 for adding information to k, and some guidance G about what operators to apply in what circumstances. We then let the acquisition system run, applying 0 to k, guided by G. If we have chosen k, 0, and G well, the system will discover a larger knowledge base K containing some conjectures that can turn out to be useful. containing, amongst other conjectures (not all of which were interesting), de Morgan's laws and the unique factorization theorem, although nothing resembling either of these was present in k, 0, or G. In fact, it also made some interesting numerical conjectures that were unknown to Lenat at the time he wrote AM. Unfortunately, when the program moved away from the symbolic domain with which it had been primed, and into the numeric domain, it made more Equipped in this way, the AM system produced a K uninteresting conjectures as well.
Lenat then observed that, since the program could make interesting conjectures in a domain such as mathematics, it should also be able to discover useful new guidance heuristics G. This led Lenat to formulate metaheuristicsheuristics about how to find heuristics-such as $a heuristic is occasionally useful but usually bad, then add specializations ofthe heuristic, and even to have the system apply this heuristic to itself. usually contains rules that are general in the sense that they contain variables. In learning by induction from examples, the knowledge acquisition part of a system will often generalize the examples it is given by replacing constants with variables (perhaps with range restrictions). A notable feature of learning by discovery is that variables ranging over function or predicate names are sometimes used; that is, viewed as logic, the process is second order. For example, Lenat's operator that specializes f ( x , y ) to f ( z, z) is intended to apply to any function of two variables. Another study [64] describes a program that discovers the geographical concept of an equator. The program is primed with some geographical facts and also with some second-order logical knowledge. McCarthy [65] gives a second-order logic technique, called circumscription, that can be used to discover some general properties of a situation. Thus, while our first two kinds of learning can often be stated in firstorder logic, there is some evidence that guidance for In learning by being told, the expertise given to the system discovery is naturally expressed in second-order logic. Since we have little experience so far in practical computing with second-order logic, it seems likely that simulation using metalanguage techniques in first-order logic [53] will be useful for learning by discovery.
Summary
We have described some of the interplay between principles and practice in expert systems.
Behind early work in the field, there was a thesis that general problem solving engines could be built, and that it would suffice to add declarative knowledge about a task to an engine to get an expert system. However, the thesis did not have a niche for procedural knowledge about how to do a task efficiently. Consequently, the thesis led to very slow computation on early machines and still cannot be supported directly on current computers. collect declarative and procedural knowledge for a specific task and be willing to write a new expert system for each task. The antithesis has the first practical expert systems to its credit and has been mainly responsible for the current commercial interest in expert systems. However, the antithesis approach is intellectually labor-intensive for task experts and for knowledge engineers whose job it is to collect and codify the expertise.
As computer power increased, a practical synthesis of the two earlier approaches appeared. The common elements of various ranges of expert system tasks are collected into expert system shells. These shells each cover a range of tasks efficiently, but no one shell is as general as the extreme form of the original thesis. Together, the shells support a wide range of tasks, so they can be collected together into toolkits for building expert systems. Many of the shells and most toolkits must still be primed by knowledge engineers, but the time taken to build an expert system is reduced.
The original thesis had a strong flavor of mathematical logic to it. About the time of the expert system shell synthesis, the Prolog language for logic programming appeared. Prolog is a restricted form of logic for which there are efficient interpreter/compilers. It appears to be very suitable for implementation on parallel machines. Although it is a language, Prolog is at a conceptual level much closer to a shell or a toolkit than to a conventional programming language. Prolog is very simple, with few language features, but an important technique called metalanguage programming allows us to tailor expert system shells. This technique provides separate niches for procedural and declarative knowledge, and the separation further eases the knowledge engineering task. Because of the connection with logic, Prolog allows us to build useful bridges from theory to the actual practice of building and using expert systems.
Even with the separation of declarative and procedural knowledge, it is clear that more can be done to ease the There followed the Feigenbaum antithesis that we should transfer of knowledge from human experts to expert systems. A good choice of knowledge representation is important, and, now that it can be supported efficiently enough, logic seems to be a highest common notation for the representations in current use. An expert system can acquire knowledge by being told (in which case we like it to help us by checking the consistency of what we say), by induction from examples, or by semi-autonomous learning from observation and discovery. A problem with induction from examples is that we usually cannot get explanations automatically from an induced expert system. Learning by being told or by induction from examples is normally a firstorder logic activity, while discovery is often guided by statements in second-order logic. However, metalanguage techniques allow us to handle some second-order logic at the first-order level.
As expert systems become more useful, it may be good to keep in mind that there are several levels of detail at which they can be built. At the least detailed level, we supply simple rules and facts that describe English (or other natural language) abstractions that people use to make decisions. As we go further into detail, we may wish to simulate certain theories about our own cognitive processes (e&, by using situation-action rules) or we may wish to simulate approximately some aspect of the real world (e.g., a mechanical device that the expert system is to diagnose). At the limits of feasible detail, we may actually simulate events in our brains at the level of individual neurons, or the detailed functioning of a mechanical device that we wish to diagnose. We have achieved most of our expert system successes so far with very little detail. It is a fascinating question whether this trend will continue, or whether we shall find it more useful to be more detailed in future.
The economically successful expert systems so far have each addressed a specialized task, such as finding mineral deposits. It is worth noting that most human experts specialize too, in professions such as geology. However, each human expert also has commonsense knowledge about the world in general and knows how to consult experts in subjects other than his or her own. While we each find it easy to do commonsense reasoning, no one so far has produced an account of how we do so (or even of the declarative knowledge we might be using) that is sufficient for us to write a "commonsense expert system." We can speculate that, as in the case of specialized expert systems, good progress will be made where there is an interplay between theory (influenced by logic) and specific empirical work in building prototype commonsense systems.
